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over the country-the new racial situation. Failure of the cities to
provide for the necessities of this particular social condition will result
in increased social, economic, and racial tensions which will endanger
the continued peace, safety, prosperity, and general welfare of the
community. Cities which have enacted fair employment practices
ordinances have partially justified such regulation on this realistic
appraisal of the relationship between race relations and community
welfare. 14
The guiding thought behind this comment has been a conviction
that the problems of race relations are going to be with us for some
time. If the municipalities fail to act in this area, the pressures will
not cease but cause greater disruption in the community and shift
their focus to other government centers, with the result that state and
federal regulation will increase. Our American ideal is to handle social
problems on a level of government as close to the people as possible.
In the field of race relations, local legislation and enforcement are
especially desirable, because particular conditions vary from area to
area. In Commonwealth v. Dub's Fried Oyster Place, the court of
appeals has decided that municipalities have the legal authority to
deal with their own civil rights concerns. This decision thus gives the
municipalities another chance to prove that local government can still
meet problems of society in our present day.
Fred G. Karem
"CoNFLicr" BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE LAW-ARKANSAS FuLL CREw
STATUTE PREEmPrED-Public Law 88-1081 provided for a special arbi-
tration board to make final resolution of issues in a dispute between
certain railroads and unions deadlocked in collective bargaining
procedures under the Railway Labor Act. A national railroad strike
threatened. The board was limited to the issues and parties described
in notices previously filed pursuant to the Railway Labor Act and was
to follow its rules of procedure. The arbitration award finally
promulgated under Public Law 88-108 contained rulings on numerous
issues, including crew consist. The award declared that a "minimum"
number of crewmen would be required on certain types of trains.
14 Minneapolis, Minn., Ordinance to Prohibit Discriminatory Practices in
Employment, Jan. 31, 1947; Cleveland, Ohio, Ordinance 15, 1579-48, Jan. 30,
1950.
128 August 1963, 77 Stat. 132.
[Vol. 53,
l9EcNT CAss
Plaintiffs brought suit against the state of Arkansas, which had a full
crew law setting the minimum one or two crewmen higher than the
arbitration award. Unions representing railroad employees intervened
on behalf of defendants. Plaintiffs then moved for summary judg-
ment. Held: Public Law 88-108 and the award issued under it
preempt the Arkansas full crew law. Chicago R.I. & Pac. R.R. Co. v.
Hardin, 2,89 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Ark. 1965).
Disregarding due process and interstate commerce clause argu-
ments as creating controversies of fact, the court stated that the
high degree of national interest in resolving the dispute clothed the
board and its actions in the robes of dominant federal interest.
Implied but never articulated was the premise that vestment of
dominant federal interest in the board gave its arbitration decision
such pervasive power as to preempt state laws in the field. The
primary test of such preemption was conflict between state and federal
legislation, whether the clash was in policy, wording or operations.
The Arkansas full crew law conflicted with the award in all three,
therefore, the state legislation was struck down.
The confusion factor in the court's opinion is signicant. In forty-
three pages the judges shotgun argue with a host of preemption and
commerce clause cases which raise every traditional argument for
striking down state laws. But the demonstration of this materiars
direct relevance to the case at bar is left to the mental processes of
some hopefully imaginative reader. The difficulty may well stem
from the fact that dispute settlement by Congressional legislation for
a special compulsory arbitration board solely for the specific contro-
versy is unique. No precedent cases exist.
The district court attempted to avoid the predicament by equating
the special board with the federal agencies set up by other labor
legislation, such as the National Labor Relations Board, relying
heavily on Teamsters v. Oliver2 and California v. Taylor.3 In those
cases, the Supreme Court held state law was preempted because it
conflicted with and would defeat full realization of the Congressional
purpose. That purpose was a uniform and pervasive national system
of labor regulation by a federal administrative body with emphasis
on collective bargaining procedures.
Yet it seems doubtful that Public Law 88-108 proposes such a
pervasive national system of regulation and administration. The
limit placed on parties by the previous notice requirement precludes
2 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
3353 U.S. 553 (1957).
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several major interstate railroads from coverage. The award itself was
regionally oriented, listing particular crew consist requirements for
railroad yards in specific Arkansas cities.4
Furthermore, the special board ceases to exist after its award is
filed in D.C. District Court, and the award is binding for only two
years.' The board even lacks its own rules of procedure.6 Does this
board have the scope to enact the same pervasive national system of
regulation as the National Labor Relations Board?
The problem here is deciding exactly what field of power Congress
delegated to the board. The board's legally competent field of regula-
tion was not defined. It should have been if an organization of dubious
national prowess was to preempt state law.7 In fact, no power to
regulate was ever delegated. The law merely set up a compulsory
arbitration board" of temporary existence to resolve the issues between
the two parties. The board was not composed of federally paid and
selected administrative personnel, but of two representatives each
from the unions and railroads and three neutrals chosen by the first
four.9 The position that this group's arbitration award preempted
state law seems to be granting the unions and railroads themselves
power to determine preemption in their own right simply by appro-
priate wording of notices filed with the National Mediation Board.
For the health of the federal system such problematical procedure
should take place only within a well defined field of power.
Even more questionable is the easy finding that the award struck
down state safety laws. The competence of the states to exercise
police power is one of the most consistently followed principles of
constitutional law. The Court may decide some state laws only
nominally belong in such a category, but the state laws are given a
presumption of validity and are never dismissed without special
4 Award of Arbitration Board No. 282, as cited in Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R.
Co. v. Hardin, -, F. Supp. -, original copy at 16, (W.D. Ark. 1965).
5 Public Law 88-108, Sec. Temporary binding force of the federal order
involved was used by the Court in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132 (1963), to show the national regulations did not form such a pervasive
scheme as to preempt state law.
6 Public Law 88-108, Sec. 4. The District Court interpreted use of Railway
Labor Act procedures to signify an amending addition to that law. Yet on the
face of the bill it is not obvious this was anything more than a shorthand method
of supplying procedure.
7 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). See also San
Diego Building Trades Council v. Carman, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Cuss v. Utah
Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
8 Russ v. Southern Ry. Co., 334 F.2d 224 (C.A. Tenn. 1964).
9 Particularized composition of the rule making body involved was a reason
for holding against preemption of state laws in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers
v. Paul, supra, note 5.
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attention to rebutting the inference. 10 The Arkansas full crew statute
was passed as a safety law, yet the district judges gave it no considera-
tion as such. It was summarily treated as just another labor regulation.
Still another doctrine of doubtful validity espoused by the learned
judges is the inference of preemption of the full crew law on the
ground that Public Law 88-108 did not expressly allow concurrent
state legislation. The supporting citation from Cloverleaf Butter Co.
v. Patterson" is merely dictum, since that case struck down a state
law preventing entrance into interstate commerce of goods already
taxed for the purpose by the Internal Revenue Code. And two more
recent decisions have said that Congressional silence implies validity
of state action.
12
The conflict test of preemption of state action as used in our case-
turning primarily on the court's unstated concept of the effect of
national interest on the state's competence to act concurrently-has
been a productive divining rod for the modern court. Conflict
between federal and state legislation disclosed by superimposing the
wording of one upon the other is of ambiguous substance.13 But the
judges are persuasive when they find that the state statute conflicts
with or stands as an obstacle to "national policy." Behind the argu-
ment is a non-technical balancing operation: Is the federal interest
sufficiently great that state competence in the immediate area limited
to the point of being preempted? An illustrating case is Paul v. United
States,14 where the national interest in the lowest possible price for
government purchases created a conflict with California minimum
price laws, although the controlling federal statute was open to the
interpretation that no such preemption had been intended by the
10 Teamsters v. Oliver, supra, note 2, at 297, the district court's leading case,
distinguished itself from the case at bar: "We have not here a case of a collective
bargaining agreement in conflict with a local health or safety regulation...
The Tenth Amendment states a presumption for state law.
In classic cases where state laws were considered invalid as safety measures,
lengthy discussion were given to the bases for second-guessing the state legisla-
tures: Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Southern Fac.
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
11315 U.S. 148 (1942).
12 Florida Lime and Avocado Growers v. Paul, supra, note 5; De Veau v.
Braiatcd, 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
' 3 Especially here. The judges used the plain and unambiguous meaning
rule as authority for the statement that the award's minimum of x crewmen was
in obvious conflict with the full crew law requirement of x + 1. This seems to
follow Mr. Justice Douglas's principle that it is ridiculous to base a decision on
a mere matter of interpretation of the controlling statute. Douglas, J., dissenting
in Mitchell v. H. B. Zachry Co., 362 U.S. 310, at 322 (1960). Against the district
court's use of superimposition of wording as showing conflict, California v. Zook,
36 U.S. 725 (1949).
14'371 U.S. 245 (1963).
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policy. Teamsters v. Oliver15 held that the national interest in effective
execution of collective bargaining procedures as expressed in the
Wagner and Taft-Hartly Acts precluded the application of state
policy limiting the solution the parties' agreement could provide.
Here the dominant interest scales tipped to the national side and the
state law was found to stand as an obstacle although it seems the Ohio
law could easily have been upheld as valid exercise of police power
restricting NLRB operation but not to a degree justifying preemption.
An alternative was in fact the holding in De Veau v. Braisted.16 The
Court stated preemption is not a problem in physics but one of
adjustment because of the interdependence and interaction of state
and federal interests. Again in Florida Lime and Avocado Growers v.
Paul17 and Parker v. Brown18 state interest in local economic regula-
tion was held valid as against federal rules easily construable as
pervasive national schemes. Thus the conflict with dominant national
interest doctrine is fruitful but yields alternative results depending
on the valuation of the respective interests in the particular case. 19
It is never done, however, without a far more penetrating analysis
of those interests than was done by this court.
It must also be noted that the easy finding of conflict with national
policy or interest runs against a long tradition of concurrent state
legislation. This same Arkansas full crew law has been three times
held by the Supreme Court not to interfers with the same national
interest in the free flow of interstate commerce.2° In one case where
the national interest was already strong enough to have preempted
the field of railroad safety equipment,2 ' state law requiring cabooses
on interstate trains for the safety of crew members was upheld.2
And Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Farmer Ed. & Coop. Union
v. WDAY, Inc., reminds us that concurrent jurisdiction is "clearly
admitted by the whole tenor" of the constitution, and the clear
doctrine of the Federalist Papers is that no state law will be stricken
unless it is "absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant."
23
15 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
16 Supra, note 12.
17 Supra, note 5.
18 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
19 In addition to cases in text; Head v. Board of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424
(1963), compared with Farmers Ed. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S.
525 (1960).2 0 Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249 (1931); St. Louis & Iron
Mtn. Ry. v. Arkansas, 240 U.S. 518 (1916); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co. V.
Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 (1911).21 Napier v. At. Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
22 Terminal R.R. Association, Inc. v. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1
(1943).2 3 Supra, note 19, at 542.
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Legislative intent has often been used to clear the fog in conflict
questions. In fact, a typical statement of the doctrine is: "whether
the state statute stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."24
Of course legislative intent is usually found by the Court from the
face of the statute, which leaves us back where we started. But Con-
gressional intent may be clearly demonstrated in the bill's legislative
history and be taken from that source as a valid indicator.25 The
legislative record of Public Law 88-108 contains clear statements
that the congressmen who prepared and passed it did not want
state full crew laws preempted.2 0 The district court's statement, that
since the legislators were aware of the preemption problem but still
refused to include statements in the bill allowing state action the
intention was to preempt, is naive. Congressional-executive relation-
ships are carried on in large part via the principle of administrator
responsibility to the Congressional committee in his field. Inclusion
of non-preemption language in the official legislation was surely
thought unnecessary by the legislators.
Accurate statement of the holding of this case must await Supreme
Court clarification of the doctrines and classifications involved, as it
has been accepted on appeal. In the interim the ruling is that the
awards promulgated by special arbitration boards established by
Congress for final resolution of specific disputes will preempt all
state law differing from the requirements set out therein, although
the requirements are framed in minimal language.
The foundations of the holding are so insecure as to render it
weak law. It is believed the court committed an inexcusable error in
failing to distinguish between the nature and scope of power delegated
by Congress to administrative agencies who are to regulate a whole
field by long term promulgation and adjudication of rules, and the
far weaker grant of power made in Public Law 88-108 to a body
which was merely to arbitrate the issues of dispute between elect
parties in a specific controversy. Allowving preemption of state laws,
24 Teamsters v. Oliver, supra, note 2.
25 Such material in legislative records is placed there purposely by Con-
gressmen as administrative guides.
26 In an original bill the arbitration was to have been done by the ICC but
the document was redrafted because there was fear the result might be taken as a
precedent by the railroad industry or perhaps other labor-management disputes.
S. Rep. No. 459, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1963).
Several Congressmen state their intent both individually and collectively that
state crew consist laws not be preempted, superceded, or modified. Hearings on
H.J. 565 Before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 111 (1963); ........ Cong. Rec. 15273 (daily ed. 28 Aug. 1963); H.R,
Rep. No. 713, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1963).
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nominally safety regulations, by a dubious interpretation of an
arbitration award passed by a board with doubtful national power
is really laying bare the health of the federal system to the evils of a
wide-open Pandora's Box. If settlement of controversies involving
labor and interstate commerce does require such arbitration awards
to be omnipotent, let us wait until Congress speaks with more
"drastic clarity."
I. Kendrick Wells
AwN-TRusT ConvmvcrAI. BANKIc-PRoDucr TEST FoR EREsrANT OF
TRADE AND Arx T TO MONOPOLZME UNDEa THE Snsuovt Acr.--The
government charged that a proposed merger between the first and
fourth largest commercial banks in an isolated market, which would
result in a merged bank having over one-half of the total assets, loans
and deposits of all commercial banks within the area, would violate
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The district court held that no
violation of either sections 1 or 2 was shown. Held: Reversed. When
merging corporations are major competitors in a relevant market, as
denoted by the percentage share of the market, the elimination of
this competition constitutes a violation of section 1. United States v.
First Natl Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
Recently, two important decisions have brought within the scope
of anti-trust laws a new and distinct "line of commerce'-commercial
banking.' Because of the long run historical movement of concentra-
tion in this field, this would appear to be a future fertile field of
federal litigation. Accordingly, it would appear beneficial to examine
what the Supreme Court considers the product market to be and
whether this definition would result in a realistic test of competition
in a majority of cases.
Several necessary assumptions have been made in order to narrow
this discussion to the single problem of denoting the Court's definition
and examining its general validity. These assumptions are that the
federal courts have jurisdiction, that a reduction of competition in
this field is an evil that should be prohibited, that concentration
figures give a realistic picture of competition, and that the product
market of commercial banking can be examined in the same way as
that of any manufacturing industry.2
1 United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 876 U.S. 665 (1963); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
2 The writer does not pass upon the economic validity of these assumptions,
but it is believed that all are implicit in the Court's consideration of the problem.
[Vol. 58,
